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Stephen F. Austin State University
ABSTRACT
Management buyout acuvity is increasingly shifiing from large firms to small firms.
However, to date, lialeis known about how such activitiesimpact the performance ofsmallfirms.
This research has identified a sample of small firms that have undergone a management buyout
and found that, relative to other firms in their respective industries, these small buyout firms
experienced performance gains simi lar to those experiencedin buyouts of larger firms. Sugges-
tions for extendi ng this area of research are made.
INTRODUCTION
Management buyouts occur when incumbent managers, in combination with outside
investors, take a firm private by purchasing all of the firm's outstanding stock (Fortier, 1989).
Such activities have grown to be an important part of American business with an estimated $235
billion of buyouts occurring during the 1980s (Zahra & Fescina, 1991). Additionally, similar
levels of activity have also begun to occur in Europe (Osborne, 1990).Despite this high level of
activity, research on such financial restructurings has remained limited, and the need to examine
their impact on business remains (Bettis, 1992; Fox & Marcus, 1992).
Specifically, the effect of buyouts on smaller businesses has yet to receive significant
investigation. To date, the principal investigations ofsmall business buyouts have addressed their
nature (Krause, 19S6; Krause, 19S7a; Malone, 1989;Mitton, 19S2; Stancill, 1988; ) and how to
evaluate whether such an activity was appropriate for a given small business (Gaffin, 1986;
Krause, 1987b; Krause, 1988; Management Review, 1986). Management buyout activity has
increasingly shifted from larger firms to smaller ones (Dobrcynski, 1991);yet little is known
Appreci ation is expressed to Dale Lunsford for his helpful comments on an earlier version of
this paper.
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about what happens to the small firm's performance as a result of the buyout. This paper seeks
to highlight these issues by conducting an exploratory examination of the ram ificauons ofbuyouts
on small firm performance during the time that the firm is privately held. Based on the tentative
findings of this study, the paper concludes with a discussion of future research directions on the
subject of small firm buyouts.
LITERATURE REVIEW
To date, seven principal articles have focused on post- buyout performance (see Table I).
These aructes have examined buyouts in a wide range of firms and have found generally that
profitability in these firms has improved. These performance gains have been attributed to
improvements in the firm's efficiency (Muscarella gi Vetsuypens, 1990).
Table 1
Organ/ear/ann/ Performance Following a Buyoiu
Author Sample Time frame Post Buyout Performance
Opler (1992) 44 LBOs LBOs occurred " increased operating
between 1985-1989, cash flows
year before LBO " improved operating
to 2 years after efficiency
Muscarefla tk 57 reverse LBO year to IPO " officers and directors




Singh (1990) 55 reverse 3 years prior to '" salesincreaseIPOandyearof
LBOs IPO and year of '" inventory DOH decrease
IPO '" operating income increases
Smith (1990) 58 MBOs 3 years prior to " cash flow/assets increased
buyout to 2 years '" cash flow/employees
after buyout increased
BUII (1989) 25 LBOs 2 years prior to '" sales/assets increased
buyout compared '" cash flow maximized
to 2 years '" ROE increased
following buyout
Kaplan (1989) 276 MBOs 2 years before '" decrease capital expenditures
MBO to 3 years " operating income/net cash
after flow improved
Lichtenberg gt 1,108buyouts 2 years before:" plant productivity increased
Siegel (1989) buyout compared
to 2 years after
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Agency theory recognizes that ownership and management in the modern corporation are
separate. Owners of the firm do not manage it; instead they hire professional (non-owner)
managers to run the firm. The theory contends that managers in such situations maximize their
own benefit rather than that of the the fum's owners or shareholders. Following a buyout,
managers gain a signiTicant level of ownership in the firm and are thus motivated to act more
consistently in the best interest of the firm (and its owners). Thus, agency theory would argue that
improvements in performance that occur following a buyout would be the result of the closer
alignment of the firm's owners'nd managers'nterests (Jensen, 1989). If this closeness of this
alignment were lessened, the manager would again have less incentive to monitor or control the
fum's costs as carefully as an owner would (Jensen Bt Meckling, 1976).
However, in a smaller firm, any single manager has greater influence and often a larger
ownership stake as well. At the lower limit, of course, there is perfect alignment since the owner
is also the only manager, which is the case in many smaller businesses. Thus, a smaller firm may
not suffer the same agency cost problems that a large firm does. This reduced threat of agency
costs in conjunction with less organizational complexity (Hannan g. Freeman, 1984) may help to
explain the overall superiority in efficiency often atuibuted to smaller businesses. Therefore, it
is not immediately clear whether agency offers a valid explanation of small buyout firm
performance, as it does for larger firms following a buyout.
Nevertheless, there is case evidence that similar performance improvements do occur in
small firms. ISI Systems provides a typical case example. This small finn resulted from a 1986
buyout of a division of Grumman Data Systems Corporation; the purchased division provided
proprietary software applications to property and casualty insurance companies. As buyouts
typically do, ISI went public again in 1987. However, during the year in which it was privately
held, managers discontinued the reselling of micmprocessor hardware. This action led to a four
percent decrease in the cost ofsales as a percentage of revenues. At the same time. ISI also reduced
its research and development (RJLD), sales, and marketing costs. Finally, while it was privately
held, IS I also managed to increase its revenue by 18percent by increasing sales in other areas, and
it achieved all this without adding additional personneL
Overall, ISI made sales gains while lowering its cost of sales by six percent. Thus, in the
relatively brief time that ISIwas privately held, this small firm gained better control of its expenses
and increased its sales. Therefore, while the principles ofagency theory may or may not hold for
small firms'ost-buyout performance, experiences such as ISI's indicate a substantial effect on
performance.
The empirical evidence gathered to date on the effects ofbuyouts on large firms and the case
observations of buyout influence on small firms are compelling. They provide sufficient reason
to expect performance improvements following small firm buyouts. Thus, the following
hypothesis will be investigated:
Hypothesis: Management buyouts of small businesses lead to gains in performance (sales,




Most firms taken private via a buyout tend to return to public trading (Kaplan, 1991). In
part, this new public stock offering represents a means for independent investors to be reimbursed
for their initial investment in the buyout(Academy Industry Program, 1990). Becoming publicly
owned again also provides a way for the firm's managers, who typically have risked a high
percentage of their personal net worth, to reduce their own financial exposure. A buyout's return
to public trading is called a "reverse management buyout".
Studying privately-held firms has always presented specia 1 problems (Dess &. Robinson,
1984; Sapienza, Gannon Jk Smith, 1988), but reverse buyouts afford researchers unique
opportunities to study the same firms as both public and private entities since their ownership
structure goes through these changes in a relatively short period of'time. Combining both pre- and
post-buyout information permits inferences to be drawn about the finn's activities while it was
privately held. Unfortunately, for a buyout turn that remains private, there is no such publicly
available information for analysis. Therefore, in a manner consistent with prior buyout research
(Muscarella gt Vetsuypens, 1990; Singh, 1990), this study used a sample drawn from reverse
management buyouts to analyze small buyout firm performance.
The exclusion from the sample of firms that failed or remained private may create bias and
is open to criticism. However, the purpose of this exploratory study is to make a case for the
importance of further investigation of small firm buyouts, and the results reported here are
intended to serve merely as a guide for more refined studies. The enhancement of the sample is,
in fact, one issue that we raise for future consideration later in this paper.
Additionally, the theoretical basis of this investigation, agency theory, posits an impact on
performance due to the level of managerial ownership (agency). Agency offers no theoretical
foundation upon which to base a prediction that the performance of excluded firms would be
different.
The data for this study on reverse management buyouts were obtained from the Securities
Data Corporation (SDC). This for-profit corporation collects 500 data items on the filings of all
initial public offerings (IPOs) of United States firms. An IPO signals a firm's intention to offer
its stock for public trading, Buyout firms that fi lcd an IPO between January I, 1980and November
25, 1988 were included. This time span was chosen because it marked a period of significant
buyout activity. In addition, choosing a ume period sufficiently in the past allowed for better
retrospection.
Information on the identified buyout firms wa's then gathered. This information was
obtained from a wide variety of public sources including annual ~eports, prospecti, Standard and
Poor's Compustat tapes, and Compact Disclosure. Financial data were located on a total of 44
reverse buyouts.
Small Firms
To date, no definition has been established and consistently used to delineate small
businesses. The definition chosen for this research is that used by the U.S. Small Business
Administration which identifies a small business as one employing 500 or fewer employees.
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Of the 44 reverse buyouts, eight were identified that met the study's three criteria for
inclusion: (I)experiencing a buyout (referred to hereinafter as MBO); (2) employing fewer than
500 employees at the time of their buyout, and (3) filing an IPO during the 1980 to 1988 time
period. (See Appendix for a list of the sample firms.) However, to further confirm that the selected
sample was indeed composed of small firms, a t-test was used to compare the sample's sales to
the other 36 reverse buyout firms in the MBO and the IPO years. Both the MBO (i = 2.41.df =
42, p = .02) and the IPO (r = 2.3, df = 42, p = .03) years showed significant differences in size.
Therefore, it is justifiable to argue that these eight firms are indeed small businesses, both by
definition based on two well-accepted measures of size as well as relative to the populauon of
reverse buyout firms.
Measures
The best data available for investigating buyout performance are accounting measures. The
use of market-based measures is not an option since buyout firms, as noted previously, are
privately held. Despite the usual concerns regarding accounung data, it has been shown that
managers do not manipulate accounting data prior to buyouts to depress the buyout price
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Rice, 1984; Kaplan, 1988). Funher, the accounting/tax changes
associated with buyouts do not impact the results reported (Bull, 1989). Thus, accounting data
should provide acceptable performance measures.
However, the concept of buyout performance is complex, and its measurement should be
multi-dimensional (Bug, 1989);but there is no commonly accepted set of performance variables
used by all researchers. In fact, one survey ofnew venture performance studies revealed more than
35 different measures of performance (Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992). For the present study, three
measures of performance were selected for investigation —sales, profit margin, and selling,
general and administrative expenses (SO&A).
It is possible, however, that changes detected in a buyout firm's performance are driven, not
by its internal efficiency improvements, but by general economic conditions in its industry. To
control for such an industry effect, changes in the performance measures were compared to the
average industry performance of the relevant industry for each sample firm.
The initial step in these comparisons was to calculate industry averages for the three-digit
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code for the principal industry of each of the eight firms.
The data for these averages were obtained from Standard and Poor's Compustat data base. The
primary, secondary and tertiary data tapes were used for these calculations to ensure that adequate
numbers of firms were used for the comparisons. Changes in performance for each of the eight
sample firms were then compared to changes in performance of the corresponding principal
industry. The average number of firms in each industry comparison group in the sample Iirm's
MBO year was 14.
Analysis
While the small size of the sample used in this study does not prohibit an exploratory
examination, it does limit the statistical strength of the analysis. Use ofa non-parametric statistic,
specifically a Mann-Whitney U test, was deemed most appropriate given the small sample size.
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RESULTS
The results of the nonparametric tests indicated support for the hypothesis. Compared
to average industry performance changes, small business buyouts showed greater gains. Both
sales (U statistic = -1.79;p = .10) and SGgtA (U statistic = -2.10;p = .05) improved for the
privately-held small businesses relative to industry averages. The small businesses experienced
a mean increase in sales of 11 percent during the private period while the overall industry mean
increase was only six percent. Similarly, the mean increase in the SG&A costs for the industries
was 11 percent during this period while the small firms'ean increase was only six percent.
The increase in profitability for the small firms versus the industry group shows a larger
mean gain for the small buyout firms (9.4 percent gain versus 7.6 percent gain). While not
statistically significant (U statistic = -.74), these means do indicate performance somewhat beuer
than the firm's relevant industry peers.
DISCUSSION
The results of this exploratory examination provide some indicauon that the hypothesis of
performance improvements following small business buyouts cannot be rejected. Small business
buyouts do appear to experience performance gains while the firm is privately held that are greater
than those achieved by other firms in their industry. Making comparisons to a firm's industry
helps to control for the impact of general economic condiuons. Both case evidence and
performance data point to increased growth, improved profital&ility, and better operating effi-
ciency for small business buyouts.
In the case of large firm buyouts, research has shown consistently that these financial
restructurings lead to improved operating performance. However, much of this gain may be due
to the reduction of agency costs in the firm. Such agency costs may not pose problems for a small
firm to the same degree as they do for a large firm; thus, there may not be as much opportunity
for improvement in small firms as in large ones.
While our results do make a preliminary case for similar improvements in small buyout
performance, the question still remains whether agency theory is an appropriate explanation for
these performance gains. Agency-based gains would be accompanied by a substantial change in
the level of managerial ownership. Adequate data on ownership levels prior to the buyout were
unavailable for statistically testing this proposition. However, the substantial changes in
ownership levels that followed the reverse buyouts in our sample hints that agency may have
played a role. In the six firms for which a determination could be made, top management team
ownership went from 91 percent during the private period to 65 percent after the IPO, a drop of
26 percentage points (28.59 decrease). A change in ownership of this magnitude suggests that
agency may have an effect on small buyout performance. These results demonsuate a clear need
forfurthertestingoftheefficacyofagencytheory inthiscontext. Compeungexplanationsshould
be explored. Other research needs are discussed in the following section.
FUTURE RESEARCH
This research has been a brief exploratory examination of small firm buyouts. However,
the small sample size has limited the strength of the conclusions that can be reached. Future
research should seek to enrich the sample and increase its size before re-examining buyout
performance.
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To date, most of what is known about buyouts is based on studies of large firms (e.g.,Seth
& Easterwood, 1993).Research effort should be directed toward identifying those areas in which
small and large finn buyouts differ. Malone (1989)pointed out that highlighting these differences
may have important public policy implications as leveraged buyouts increasingly come under
legislative scrutiny. Public policy designed solely around large firm buyout experiences could
prove to be detrimental and even devastating for small firms. For example, a small business
manager's role is frequently different in nature from that of a manager in a large business. Small
business managers rarely enjoy the same task specialization that their counterparts in larger
businesses do; rather, they are more often called upon to be generalists. This broader perspective
of the overall business may account for differences in managerial behavior with regard to buyouts.
Another potential difference between large and small firms is their strategic choices for
restructuring the business following the buyout. Prior studies have found that buyout firms
undergo significant restructuring activities (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1991;Seth &Easterwood,
1993). However, these studies focused almost solely on large firms. Small firms, however,
typically have less elaborate internal structures and control mechanisms (S in gh, Tucker, & House,
1986). This relative informality may influence the smaller firm's restructuring decisions in
several ways. First, the small firm may require less restructuring since there is typically less
bureaucratic "fat" impeding its efficient performance. Whereas large firms may enjoy the luxury
of slack resources, small firms rarely have such a cushion and must be efficient in order to survive
in the first place. Thus, efficiency gains such those detected in this investigation, may be much
more difficult to achieve in the small firm. Future research should examine the nature of the
restructuring activities that follow a smafl business buyout and how the strategic intent of that
restructuring may differ from activities and intenuons in large businesses.
Finally, future research should seek to identify those factors associated with successful
buyouts. A potential drawback to the methodology used in this study, which relies on
performance data from reverse management buyouts, is that those buyouts that do not return to
public trading are automatically excluded from consideration. There may be key differences
between buyouts that remain private and those that do not. Seth and Easterwood (1993)have
suggested, for example, that the longevity ofa buyout is tied to the degree of restructuring needed.
Future research should seek to expand buyout databases in order to compare buyouts based on the
magnitude of their performance gains. Attempts should also be made to gain information on
buyouts that remain private as well as those that faiL Such studies may necessitate the collection
of primary data and may have to rely on performance data abstracted from managerial percep-
tions. This methodology could be difficult to execute. Malone (1989),for example, reported that
many of the non-respondents to his survey of small company buyouts indicated that it was against
their corporate policy to release such information. A number of factors such as the principal
industry in which the firm competes, the size of the firm, its prior profitability, and its level of
diversification may impact the success of the buyout. Factors such as these should be identified
and examined as well with an eye toward developing contingency prescriptions for successful
small business buyouts.
This paper has used some preliminary findings to build a case for future research that will
help to answer these and other questions about the ramifications of buyouts for small businesses.
No single study will provide all the answers; instead a stream ofresearch will be required to probe
all of the possible avenues of investigation. It is hoped that this initial investigation will serve as
a guide as well as a challenge to encourage more in-depth analyses of small firm buyouts. The
market for buyouts is increasingly moving to smaller businesses. Owners and managers of small
businesses need to understand how such buyouts can affect their firms and how to maximize the
positive aspects of a buyout for their businesses.
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APPENDIK
Reverse Buyout Sample Firms
Buyout Principal
Sample firm year SIC
A&W Brands 1986 208
Cal ton Inc. 1985 153
Continental Homes 1985 152
DSP Tech 1984 382
HDR Power Systems 1984 362
ISI Systems 1986 737
MBS Textbook Exchange 1985 594
Southern Elecuonics 1986 506
19
